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played by reason in various Greek theories; Augustine's doctrine of the good and the bad will, and the modern rationalistic accounts of the relations of mind and body. Kant, he thinks, is enabled to hold causality and freedom side by side, only by lifting morality out of the world of phenomena, and thus making man a member of two universes. The relation between these two human natures remains a mystery for German idealism; that mystery Lipps seeks to grasp in terms of actuality. As thinking beings, he holds, we are convinced of the thoroughly necessary character of human conduct. Man must act in the way in which he does act. The preconditions of each act, however, can never be completely indicated; and this inevitable residuum of uncertainty leads us naïvely to postulate a will essentially free. Thus the problem of freedom and determinism, Lipps concludes, involves the discrimination between the naïve and the critical attitude towards human conduct. Clark University. RADOSLAV A. TSANOFF.

Ethics. By G. E. MOORE. New York, Henry Holt and Company; London, Williams and Norgate, 1912, pp. 256.

The aim of the author is "to state and distinguish clearly from one another . . . the most important of the different views which may be held upon a few of the most fundamental ethical questions" (p. 11). This he attempts to do by devoting a third of his book to an analytic statement of utilitarianism, and the remaining two-thirds to an examination of possible criticisms of that theory. Moore defends utilitarianism against the line of attack which consists in saying that right and wrong are merely subjective predicates. To say that an action is right or wrong, intrinsically good or bad, is not to say that one has towards it any mental attitude whatever. Nor is there sufficient reason for accepting as the test of right and wrong the intrinsic nature of the action, the motive prompting it, or its probable consequences. The discussion of free will "concludes with a doubt" (p. 222). The egoistic objection to utilitarianism is likewise rejected; but after disposing of all other criticisms of that theory, Moore advances his own, which he considers fatal; utilitarianism claims that rightness and wrongness depend on the intrinsic value of the consequences of our actions, and yet it does not rightly decide what constitutes intrinsic value.

The book is intended for the lay reader; the continual iteration of apparently simple ideas seems to indicate that the author was perhaps too well aware of his task as popularizer. The central place which is given to utilitarianism doubtless provides a convenient opportunity for presenting the author's own point of view in minute and finely spun reflections on hedonism; but it leaves the reader with a wrong historical perspective of ethical theory. The method of exposition, also, is unfortunate: the popular reader is offered hairsplitting distinctions and abstract explanations in terms of the conventional *A* and *B*. Unduly replete with technicalities which are out of place in an elementary treatise, and lacking almost any concrete illustrations from daily life, this book is at once too subtle and too dry for its purpose. Clark University. RADOSLAV A. TSANOFF.

Elemente der Völkerpsychologie, Grundlinien einer psychologischen Entwicklungsgeschichte der Menschheit. Von WILHELM WUNDT. Zweite unveränderte Auflage. Leipzig, A. Kröner, 1913. pp. xii, 523. M. 14.

The monumental volumes of Wundt's *Völkerpsychologie* find not only a summary but also a crowning supplement in the *Elemente der Völker-*

psychologie. Here the entire mental history of man is outlined in a continuous narrative; the various activities, such as custom, myth and religion, and art, are not separated but dealt with in conjunction. We pass from 'Primitive Man' to 'the Age of Totemism,' then to 'the Age of Heroes and Gods,' and finally into 'the Development toward Humanity.' It is safe to say that no other man could have told the story as Wundt has; his vast learning, powerful psychologic insight, vivid sense of history, and, not least, his stylistic ability to present states of flow and change have produced a work of tremendous and awing effect.

It is not necessary to recall here the justification of a social psychology as an inevitable consequence of the rejection, by empirical science, of the metaphysical postulate of an individual soul as the substratum or receiver of experience.¹ Familiar, also, are the general results of the social psychological method: the exclusion of reflective rationalizing explanations, in which logical processes are falsely projected by the explainer into the communal developments. In the *Elemente* one can see the larger results of this methodic precaution. Nowhere is a reflection about the consequences of a development assumed as the cause of that development. Hence the frequent reversal of the naïve view of things: the demon is not a causal explanation of natural happenings, but a creation of emotions, especially fear (p. 355), for the primitive knows only magic causality (pp. 90 ff.). Again, the god grows out of the demon, religion out of the beliefs in demons and spirits, and law out of custom. All this is too familiar to require comment.

In one respect, however, the *Elemente* differs, even externally, from the *Völkerpsychologie*. In the latter the subject of language receives two volumes, placed at the beginning of the work,—naturally enough, for language is 'the universal substratum of mental culture' ('die allgemeine Trägerin der geistigen Kultur,' *Elemente*, p. 487). And it appears, at first, when one studies these volumes, that Wundt's social psychology has done for our knowledge of linguistic development exactly what it has done for the other spheres of social activity. Especially the processes of linguistic change had been interpreted only too much as if they were acts of logical reflection; by putting an end to such interpretation and showing the concrete psychological character of changes in language, Wundt has done an inestimable service to the science of linguistics. In the *Elemente*, however, we find but a few pages in the division on 'Primitive Man' (I, §§ 5 and 6) devoted to language. A sketch of gesture-language and one of a supposedly rather 'primitive' language, the Ewe of Togoland, is all we receive. Of the development from lower to higher forms, or even of any criteria of distinction between these, we learn nothing. This is due to the fact that minute analysis of the processes of change is excluded from the *Elemente*. Descriptions—and Wundt is a master of what may be called kinetic description—of typical stages of the social institutions suffice for the purposes of this book. Could they not have been given for language also? In the *Völkerpsychologie* Wundt has contributed much toward the detailed psychological interpretation of the processes of linguistic change, but toward a history of the development of language ('die generelle Entwicklung') he has given little. The origin of language is splendidly treated and there are valuable ideas and discussions which have bearing on the general further evolution of language; but an outline of this evolution or even a sufficient indication of the direction of

¹ *Völkerpsychologie*⁸, I, I, p. 9; *Grundriss der Psychologie*¹¹, § 2, I.

development there is not. This, I believe, accounts for the scant treatment of language in the *Elemente*, where only such an outline, with portrayal of typical stages would have been in harmony. Toward this we find in the *Elemente* only a sketch of the origin of vocal language in the light of gesture (Wundt's greatest single linguistic contribution lies here), and then the description of a 'primitive' language.

To regard Ewe as such is, however, a mistake. Language, like the other communal activities, changes most rapidly where there is most contact of communities,—where there are wars, migrations, and, above all, transferences of language to new peoples; and Africa, everything indicates, has long been the scene of all these happenings (*Elemente*, pp. 136 ff.). Further, Ewe is spoken by several millions of people and even serves as a literary language.² It is a member, moreover, of the widespread West-Sudanese family of languages, which possibly may be related to the other great family of the Bantu languages. Plainly, then, this language has behind it a long history of spread, migration, and change. This becomes a certainty when we learn more of its forms. It is a nearly monosyllabic language: the languages of whose history we know anything show a constant shortening of the word toward monosyllabism. This is the direction in which the languages of Europe have developed, especially, of course, English. When, further, we learn that in Ewe the word-order is fixed, we must entirely refuse it the title of a 'primitive' language, for linguistic history everywhere shows us that the syntactic utilization of word-order is a gradual accomplishment. Wundt thinks it a primitive characteristic that in Ewe the modifying word follows its subject ('man big,' not 'big man'), as in gesture-language. It is obvious that fixed word-order allows of only two possibilities, the one realized in Ewe, as in modern French (where we can see it growing out of the free word-order of Latin), the other, for instance, in modern English and in Chinese. Of the Indo-Chinese family of languages,—divergent modern forms of a single older speech,—Chinese and Burmese let the modifier precede, Tibetan and Siamese let it follow. In other words, the correspondence of the Ewe word-order with the order of gesture is, for the question in hand, accidental. When Wundt further cites lack of inflection as a primitive characteristic, he runs directly counter to the evidence of all known linguistic history. Wundt further cites the prevalence of what is called sound-symbolism, but this, again, is a feature which we see growing in some highly developed languages, notably German and English,—as Wundt admits (*Elemente*, p. 67). The symbolic words,—such as, for instance, in English, *clash*, *crack*, *crunch*, *sputter*, *splutter*,—originate by the same processes as other words and can by no means be cited as traces of the birth-hour of language. No objection can be made to the statement that the method of expression in Ewe is highly concrete. It is an accepted doctrine, however,—and one supported by Wundt's own chapter on Semantic Change in the *Völkerpsychologie*,—that abstract expressions develop at need out of concrete, provided the individualization of concepts (cf. below) has once taken place. A language like Ewe has no highly abstract expressions because the people who speak it have no occasion to speak of abstract matters. Should the occasion arise, the words would soon find themselves.³

² Finck, *Die Sprachstämme des Erdkreises*, p. 119; cf. also Cust, *The Modern Languages of Africa*, pp. 203 ff.

³ Cf. especially F. Boas, *Handbook of American Indian Languages*, I, 64 ff.

The source of Wundt's error lies in the fact that, to repeat, his social psychology does not contain in regard to language a view of the general development comparable to that of the other fields of social activity. It would be needless here to give a detailed statement of Wundt's views on points related to this question. Suffice it to say that the rationalizing interpretation, which here also reverses the true course of development, is not entirely overcome in the *Völkerpsychologie*. In its extreme form this interpretation sees 'primitive' language as a system of monosyllabic words, each with a separate conceptual content; in the course of development these gradually merge into an 'agglutinative' state, in which a number of them lose their full conceptual value and become modifying affixes; finally the syllables of such groups lose their formal and semantic identity still more, until polysyllabic inflected words, like those of Latin and Greek, result. As the historically observable course of events is always diametrically opposed to this, the auxiliary supposition becomes necessary that development continues only until a language 'enters into history' (by being recorded in writing), at which point there begins a period of 'decay.' This theory, developed chiefly by August Schleicher, may be seen in its application to the various languages of the world in A. Hovelacque's book, *La linguistique* (fourth edition, Paris, 1888). The selection of Ewe as a typical 'primitive' language,—even though Wundt is far beyond the grossness of such theorizing as I have described.—is nevertheless a reflex of such views. Actually,—that is, wherever the facts are accessible,—language is always seen to develop from longer words to shorter, from words involving more experience-content to words of simpler conceptual value. Or, more correctly, the sentence of imperfectly analyzable associative structure, whose parts merely resemble parts of other sentences, gives place to the sentence fully analyzable into separately apperceptible units (words) which are felt to occur with unchanged identity in other sentences. It is this contrast which really embodies the linguistic phase of Wundt's statement (*Elemente*, p. 73): 'So ist das Denken des Primitiven fast rein assoziativ. Noch ist die vollkommenere Form der Verknüpfung der Begriffe, die apperzeptive, die den Gedanken in ein Ganzes zusammenfasst, nur spurweise in der Verbindung der einzelnen Erinnerungsbilder vorhanden.' We must, accordingly, mark as most primitive those languages in which the sentence scarcely or not at all breaks up into words, but is analyzable only as an associative complex, in the sense that parts of it resemble parts of other sentences. Thus a language in which 'I-cut-bear's-leg-at-the-joint-with-a-flint-now' is a single highly inflected word⁴ is a relatively primitive language. By the same token Latin *ambulo*, *ambulas*, *ambulat*, *ambulabam* are as sentences more primitive than, say, the English equivalents *I am walking*, *you are walking*, *he (she) is walking*, *I was walking*, because the English sentences consist of several independent symbols each with conceptual value (words), while the Latin expression views each occurrence as a whole, with only associative indication of resemblance to other occurrences.

The importance of a proper understanding of these things for the mental history of man is not only guaranteed by the function of speech as the substratum of communal mental life, but follows immediately from the nature of our concepts of quality, action, and relation. These,—as no one has, to my knowledge, better described than Wundt (*Völkerpsychologie*³, I, 2, p. 513 ff.)—depend for their existence upon

⁴ R. A. Marrett, *Antropology*, p. 139.

a separately apperceived object of symbolic value which serves as dominant element in the complex forming the concept. This symbol-object is, of course, the word: without it no concept of action, quality, or relation can exist. Hence, without independent words for such ideas, no scientific thought is possible. The central thread of the mental history of man is a development whose most immediate external manifestation is the attainment of linguistic symbols for concepts other than those of objects. L. Lévy-Bruhl, in his *Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures* (Paris, 1910), has observed the connection between primitive habits of thought and non-isolating habits of speech. So much is certain: no people, so far as is known, has arrived at what may properly be called logical or scientific thought without speaking a language at least as far along toward conceptual expression as Sanskrit, Ancient Greek, or Latin. The 'magic causality' of the savage becomes fully intelligible only when we learn that his thought lacks the linguistic forms which make possible our logic. I shall quote a few passages from the *Elemente* which, now more or less parenthetical, could, by a juster and fuller treatment of the evolution of language, have become integral, and, I venture to think, central motifs of the discussion. Pp. 91 ff., especially p. 93: 'Kausalität in unserem Sinne existiert für den primitiven Menschen nicht. Will man auf seiner Bewusstseinsstufe überhaupt von dieser reden, so kann man nur sagen: ihn beherrscht die Zauberkausalität. Diese aber bindet sich nicht an Regeln der Verknüpfung der Vorstellungen, sondern an Motive des Affekts.' P. 463 f.: 'das Heldenzeitalter . . . , dessen Grundstimmung die Gebundenheit an die objektive Welt ist, in die zwar das Subjekt seine eigenen Gemütsbewegungen hinüberströmen lässt, die es aber niemals von den Objekten zu lösen vermag . . . '

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The Measurement of Induction Shocks. A Manual for the Quantitative Use of Faradic Stimuli. ERNEST G. MARTIN, Ph. D. New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1912, vii. pp. 117.

This is a collection and systemization of a series of papers published during the last five years. In physiology to-day there is a great deal of work with the artificial stimulation of tissue, and induction shocks are usually used for this purpose. For quantitative work it is necessary to have an exact measurement of the intensity of the shock in order to control one's own experiment or to repeat those of some other investigator. This book is an exposition for the calibrating of induction apparatus so that the value of the shocks may be expressed in stimulation units and so that the calibration can be determined in any ordinarily equipped physiological laboratory. Martin does not present a new method but rather an extension and systemization of other methods of recognized worth.

The factors which may affect the strength of the faradic current are: I. Variations in the primary coil, due to (1) the amount of current yielded by the source; (2) the key whereby the current is made or broken. II. Variations in the secondary coil, due to (1) the position of the secondary with relation to the primary coil; (2) the electrical resistance of the tissue which is being stimulated; (3) the contacts between the stimulating electrodes and the tissue to which they are applied. These factors can all be determined mathematically and a clear and lucid explanation is given of the determinations of these variables. Besides different inductoria present structural differences which may cause variation, due to (1) the dimensions and